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AssertabilityReasoning with conditionals is central to everyday life, yet there is long-standing disagreement about the
meaning of the conditional. One example is the puzzle of so-called missing-link conditionals such as ‘‘if
raccoons have no wings, they cannot breathe under water.” Their oddity may be taken to show that con-
ditionals require a connection between antecedent (‘‘raccoons have no wings”) and consequent (‘‘they
cannot breathe under water”), yet most accounts of conditionals attribute the oddity to natural-
language pragmatics. We present an experimental study disentangling the pragmatic requirement of dis-
course coherence from a stronger notion of connection: probabilistic relevance. Results indicate that
mere discourse coherence is not enough to make conditionals assertable.
 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Indicative conditionals, that is, sentences of the form ‘‘If p, then
q,” are everywhere. We utter them in everyday conversations, in
political or legal debates, or in scientific discourse, for instance:(1) a. If I don’t leave in five minutes, I will be late for the
meeting.b. If we keep emitting greenhouse gases at our current
pace, the oceans will rise and many cities will be
flooded.It is unsurprising then that there has been huge interest in con-
ditionals from psychology (Evans & Over, 2004; Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 2002), linguistics (Declerck & Reed, 2001; Elder &
Jaszczolt, 2016; Kratzer, 1986), and philosophy (Adams, 1975;
Bennett, 2003; Douven, 2016; Edgington, 1995). Despite long-
standing interest, many basic questions about how to interpret
conditionals remain unresolved. One puzzle is the oddity of
so-called missing-link conditionals, for instance:(2) a. If Russia never joined the European Union, Bogota is
the capital of Colombia.b. If raccoons have no wings, they cannot breathe under
water.A natural response is to claim that an indicative conditional
conveys some kind of connection between antecedent, p, and con-
sequent, q. In its strong form, this view takes such a connection to
be part of the semantics of conditionals. However, the most com-
mon approach has been to attribute the ‘‘weirdness” of missing-
link conditionals to pragmatics—non-literal, speaker-intended
meaning that makes ‘‘Can you pass the salt?” a request for salt,
not a question about an ability. As Grice (1989) observed, prag-
matic considerations may make a true sentence unassertable in
context. For instance, the sentence:(3) Some horses are mammals.is a strange thing to say, because it suggests, or implicates, that not
all horses are mammals. Someone asserting (3), however, would not
be saying anything false (from a purely semantic perspective).
A whole host of otherwise divergent theories which do not posit
an intrinsic connection between antecedent and consequent have
appealed to pragmatics to explain the oddity of missing-link
conditionals, alongside other deviations between theory and
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render valid an inferential transition from two true statements
(such as ‘‘raccoons have no wings” and ‘‘raccoons cannot breathe
under water”) to not only their conjunction (‘‘raccoons have no
wings and cannot breathe under water”) but also the conditional
(‘‘if raccoons have no wings, they cannot breathe under water”).
That is, whenever two statements are true, the conditional combin-
ing them is true also. Such inferences, however, are obviously not
valid, if conditionals require a connection between the clauses.
Known technically as ‘‘centering”1 this inference is entailed by most
accounts of indicative conditionals in the philosophical and psycho-
logical literature, such as the material interpretation (Grice, 1989;
Jackson, 1987), Stalnaker’s interpretation (Stalnaker, 1968, 1975),
Mental Models Theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002), and the suppo-
sitional theory (Adams, 1975; Edgington, 1995; Evans & Over, 2004).
The proponents of these accounts do not deny that sentences
such as (2a) and (2b) are odd, or that people might hesitate to
endorse ‘‘centering” for them (see, e.g., Cruz et al., 2016;
Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016a), but claim that the oddity of
missing-link conditionals is due to pragmatics (see, e.g., Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 651, or Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans,
Handley, & Sloman, 2007, p. 92). Few authors, however, hint at
any specific pragmatic mechanism that would explain this phe-
nomenon. An exception seems to be a recent paper by Cruz et al.
(2016, p. 1108) who claim that:
. . .what matters for the intuition that there is something odd in
conditionals like ‘‘If Hillary Clinton runs for president in 2016,
the earth weighs more than 2 kilograms,” is the absence of a
common topic of discourse between p and q, rather than the
absence of a specific connection.This suggests that the connection between antecedents and
consequents may be nothing more than what we normally expect
of any two statements constituting a coherent piece of discourse. A
direct way to test the pragmatic hypothesis is by creating scenarios
that pit discourse coherence against a stronger, probabilistic con-
nection, and examine the impact of these two factors on peoples’
judgements. The present paper reports a study to this effect.
1.1. Discourse coherence and probabilistic relevance
It is not without merit to argue that antecedents and conse-
quents of indicative conditionals need to be connected, because
speakers expect any consecutive elements of discourse to be con-
nected in some way. Discourse, after all, is not a random collection
of sentences, but has implicit organization. Compare the following
sentences from (Hobbs, 1979):ce
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er, Oak
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gmana.infere
” or
equi
prem
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sford
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n, andJames took a train from Paris to Istanbul. He has
family there.b. James took a train from Paris to Istanbul. He likes
spinach.Both examples consist of two pieces of information, which are
not strange in themselves and which we can easily imagine to be
true about a particular James. However, while (4a) is a perfectlynce from ‘‘p and q” to ‘‘if p then q” is referred to as ‘‘one-premise
‘‘conjunctive sufficiency,” and it can be distinguished from (psycholog-
valent) ‘‘two-premise centering,” which takes p as one premise and q as
ise. Whether or not lay people endorse either form of centering is a
troversy. For example, Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, and Over (2015), Cruz,
, and Baratgin (2016) and Politzer and Baratgin (2015) found evidence
ne-premise centering. By contrast, a recent paper by Skovgaard-Olsen,
Klauer (2016a) finds evidence against.natural thing to say, (4b) raises eyebrows. The reason seems rather
straightforward: spinach does not have much to do with a train
trip to Istanbul; the two sentences seem disconnected.
Consecutive elements of discourse, p and q, can be related in
various ways. For instance, q may elaborate on, or explain, p. In
most cases, unless signalled otherwise, p and q are expected to at
least be on the same topic. In (4b), this expectation is violated,
unless we can conjure up a link (e.g., the speaker wants to suggest
that eating a lot of spinach is correlated with a fear of flying, or that
Istanbul is culinary heaven for spinach lovers; cf. Asher &
Lascarides, 2003; Kehler, 2002; Stojnic´, 2016).
Where p and q are the antecedent and consequent of a condi-
tional, however, we arguably expect a stronger connection than
just any discourse coherence relation. One candidate is probabilis-
tic relevance, conventionally operationalized with the Dp rule2:
Dp ¼ PrðqjpÞ  Prðqj:pÞ
Whenever Dp > 0, we say that p is positively relevant for q. Dp ¼ 0
indicates irrelevance, while Dp < 0 indicates negative relevance
(see, e.g., Oberauer, Weidenfeld, & Fischer, 2007; Over et al., 2007;
Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, & Klauer, 2016b). In other words, prob-
abilistic relevance means that p either raises or lowers the probabil-
ity of q.
Though we contrast probabilistic relevance with discourse coher-
ence in this paper it is important to understand that probabilistic rel-
evance itself gives rise to discourse coherence. While it is not
uncommon for two coherent elements of discourse to be probabilis-
tically independent, whenever p actually raises the probability of
q; p and q occurring together in a conversation should constitute a
coherent piece of discourse. The following examples illustrate this.20(5)2 One
08) ora.could
inferJohn forgot to take his umbrella. My husband Bob
never carries an umbrella.b. John forgot to take his umbrella. He will get wet.Here, the probability of ‘‘Bob never carries an umbrella” would
not be expected to be higher under the supposition that John forgot
to take his umbrella, but the two sentences together nevertheless
appear coherent. They can constitute two consecutive elements
of discourse. In (5b), the conditional probability of John’s getting
wet given that he forgot to take his umbrella is higher than the
probability of ‘‘John will get wet” on it own. This in itself connects
the two clauses. In other words, while it is difficult to envision
probabilistic relevance without discourse coherence, it is readily
possible to have discourse coherence without probabilistic rele-
vance. This possibility forms the basis of our experimental test.
1.2. The present experiment
We investigated whether people expect a stronger connection
between the antecedent and consequent of an indicative condi-
tional than between other consecutive elements of discourse. More
specifically, we aimed to disentangle the effect of probabilistic rel-
evance from (mere) discourse coherence.We compared how people
evaluate conditionals with how they evaluate the consequents of
those conditionals in conversational contexts in which the antece-
dents have already been asserted (see Figs. 1a and 1b).
Our test factorially combined probabilistic relevance (positive rel-
evance, irrelevance) and discourse coherence (same topic, different
topics). However, given that probabilistic relevance, whenever it is
salient to interlocutors, establishes discourse coherence, the combi-
nation positive relevance/no discourse coherence is practically not
possible. This left the following conditions for comparison:also think of the connection in terms of evidential support (Douven,
ential relations (Krzy _zanowska, 2015).
Fig. 1a. An example of a PR-ST item in the conditionals condition.
Fig. 1b. An example of a PR-ST item in the conversational exchanges condition.
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2. irrelevance & same topic (IR-ST)
3. irrelevance & different topic (IR-DT)
These within-participant conditions were combined with a
between-participant manipulation of type of discourse (condi-
tional/conversational exchange): the two clauses were presented
either in a conditional or as two consecutive turns in a conversa-
tional exchange (detailed examples follow below).
We asked participants two questions: one probed how natural
the clauses were to assert (‘‘assertability”) and one asked whether
it made sense for a speaker to say them (‘‘sensibleness”). We
expected neither the exchange nor the conditional to be assertable
(sensible) where the two clauses were on different topics. Con-
versely, we expected equal assertability (sensibleness) when the
two clauses were both on the same topic and connected via prob-
abilistic relevance. Crucially, however, we expected only the
exchange, and not the conditional, to be assertable where there
was only a common topic, but not probabilistic relevance.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
101 individuals completed the online survey on the MTurk plat-
form (https://www.mturk.com/). 100 participants indicated Eng-
lish as their first (native) language. We removed one (male)
participant whose first language was not English. Of the 100 partic-
ipants who remained, 42 were female, 56 male, 1 agender and 1
bigender. Their mean age was 33.77 (range 18–66). All participants
received a small remuneration.2.2. Materials and procedure
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two
groups: the conditional or the conversational exchange condition.
Within these conditions, each participant received 18 blocks pre-
sented in a random order one at a time. Each block consisted of a
conversational context followed by two questions concerning con-ditionals or exchanges exemplifying different combinations of
probabilistic relevance and same/different discourse topic:
PR-ST: ‘‘If Sophie likes the Alps, then she will enjoy hiking in the
Pyrenees.”
IR-ST: ‘‘If Sophie likes the Alps, then mountaineering can be
dangerous.”
IR-DT: ‘‘If Sophie likes the Alps, then more and more people in Wes-
tern Europe care about animal welfare.”
The first question concerned assertability and was immediately
followed by the question about sensibleness. The dependent vari-
ables were marked on 7-point Likert-style scale. Figs. 1a and 1b
show example items from conditionals and conversational
exchanges conditions, respectively.3. Results
Figs. 2 and 3, which show histograms of the individual ratings in
each condition, already clearly reveal marked differences in the
response distributions across conditions. Supplemental statistical
analyses were performed on the mean rating (averaged across
items) for each participant. Because of the necessarily missing cell
(positive relevance PR & different topic DT), we split the analyses
by same/different topic.
For the ‘‘different topic” conditions, we ran independent-
samples comparisons by type of discourse (i.e. conditionals versus
conversational exchange). For the ‘‘same topic” conditions, we ran
2 2 mixed analyses (probabilistic relevance  type of discourse).
Throughout, the residuals showed moderate departures from the
normal distribution. Moreover, there were unequal numbers of
participants in the between-participants conditions. In such cir-
cumstances, standard analyses can perform poorly (Wilcox,
2016). We followed Wilcox’s (2016) guidelines for such situations,
running both standard and robust analyses. Robust analyses used
20% trimmed means, and were performed in R (R Core Team,
2016) using functions from Wilcox (2016) and the WRS2 package
(Mair, Schoenbrodt, & Wilcox, 2016). To correct for multiple com-
parisons, we chose significance levels of p ¼ :025 for the mixed
Fig. 2. Results for the ‘‘assertability” question, DT condition.
Fig. 3. Results for the ‘‘assertability” question, ST condition. Note the different scale for the y axis.
202 K. Krzy _zanowska et al. / Cognition 164 (2017) 199–205
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for the ‘‘assertability” question.
PR-ST IR-ST IR-DT
Conditionals
Mean 5.91 2.44 1.37
SD 0.82 1.07 0.98
Exchanges
Mean 5.77 4.92 1.48
SD 0.87 1.09 1.01
Table 2
Descriptive data for the ‘‘sensibleness” question.
PR-ST IR-ST IR-DT
Conditionals
Mean 6.11 2.56 1.37
SD 0.67 1.19 0.95
Exchanges
Mean 5.88 5.13 1.50
SD 0.90 0.88 1.16
4 The bwtrim function returns the test statistic Q, which is approximately
F-distributed. The function returns neither degrees of freedom nor effect sizes.
5 The mean differences reported for robust analyses are the differences in 20%
trimmed means.
6 In response to reviewer suggestion we added a comparison between same and
different topic irrelevant conditionals as reported by Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a).
While these authors found no significant difference between these, we did. Items with
the same topic were rated on average 1.06 higher than with different topics,
tð48Þ ¼ 8:70; p ¼< :001; d ¼ 1:03, and 1.20 higher with 20% trimmed means, robust
tð30Þ ¼ 9:05; p ¼< :001; n ¼ :79. The same effect was found in the exchanges: mean
difference 3.44, tð51Þ ¼ 15:81; p < :001; d ¼ 3:27; and trimmed mean difference of
3.93, tð31Þ ¼ 21:22; p < :001; n ¼ :96. These analyses are included in the correction
for multiple comparisons. Closer scrutiny of Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016a)’s
materials reveals a different notion of ‘‘same topic” than ours (which is determined
K. Krzy _zanowska et al. / Cognition 164 (2017) 199–205 203analyses and for the different-topics analyses, and p ¼ :004 for the
simple-effects analyses.
Table 1 above shows the descriptive data of the ‘‘assertability”
question. We begin with the analysis of the ‘‘different topic” (DT)
conditions.
3.1. Different topics
As Fig. 2 shows, the absence of a common discourse topic ren-
ders both the conversational exchange and the conditionals
equally unassertable. In fact, there were no significant differences
between conditionals and conversational exchanges either with
conventional independent-samples t-tests, tð99Þ ¼ :55; p ¼ :58;
d ¼ :11, or with the robust analysis with 20% trimmed means
tð45:81Þ ¼ :81; p ¼ :42; n ¼ :133 (robust independent-samples
t-test using ‘‘yuen” function).
3.2. Same topic
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of responses in the ‘‘same topic”
(ST) conditions. Visual inspection suggests an interaction: whereas
probabilistically irrelevant clauses on the same topic receive
‘‘definitely yes” as the modal response in the discourse condition,
the modal response for conditionals is ‘‘definitely no”. Statistical
analysis confirms this impression.
A 2 2 mixed ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of
probabilistic relevance, Fð1;99Þ ¼ 337:16; p < :001, partial
g2 ¼ :77. The main effect of task was also significant,
Fð1;99Þ ¼ 58:49; p < :001, partial g2 ¼ :37, as was the interaction
between probabilistic relevance and task, Fð1;99Þ ¼ 120:9;
p < :001, partial g2 ¼ :56.
To explore the interaction further, we ran simple-effects analy-
ses. Firstly, we compared the effect of probabilistic relevance for
each type of discourse. For conditionals, relevant items were given
ratings on average 3:47 higher than irrelevant items. This differ-
ence was significant, Fð1;99Þ ¼ 422:62; p < :001, partial
g2 ¼ :81. For exchanges, relevant items were given ratings on aver-
age :85 higher than irrelevant items. This difference was also sig-
nificant—Fð1;99Þ ¼ 26:88; p < :001, partial g2 ¼ :21—but note
the substantially smaller effect size. Secondly, we compared the
effect of type of discourse for each level of probabilistic relevance.
For probabilistically relevant items, conditionals were given rat-
ings on average :14 higher than exchanges. This difference was
not significant, Fð1;99Þ ¼ :65; p ¼ :42, partial g2 ¼ :01. For proba-
bilistically irrelevant items, exchanges were given ratings on aver-
age 2:48 higher than conditionals. This difference was significant,
Fð1;99Þ ¼ 133:25; p < :001, partial g2 ¼ :57.
To support these analyses, we ran complementary robust anal-
yses using the WRS2 package. These analyses used 20% trimmed
means. A robust mixed ANOVA (the ‘‘bwtrim” function) yielded a
significant main effect of probabilistic relevance, Q ¼ 355:86;3 n is a robust explanatory measure of effect size. 0:10; 0:30, and 0:50 correspond
to small, medium, and large effect sizes. For discussion, see Mair and Wilcox (2016).p < :001, and of task, Q ¼ 59:05; p < :001. The interaction was
also significant, Q ¼ 150:37; p < :0014
We followed up the interaction by carrying out simple effects
analyses with robust t-tests. Firstly, we explored the effect of
probabilistic relevance for each type of discourse, using robust
paired t-tests (the ‘‘yuend” function). For conditionals, relevant
items were given ratings on average5 3:81 higher than irrelevant
items. This difference was significant, tð30Þ ¼ 18:69; p < :001;
n ¼ :97. For exchanges, relevant items were given ratings on average
:81 higher than irrelevant items, tð31Þ ¼ 5:96; p < :001; n ¼ :56.
Secondly, we compared the effect of type of discourse for each level
of probabilistic relevance, using robust independent-samples t-tests
(the ‘yuen’ function). For relevant items, conditionals were given rat-
ings on average :22 higher than exchanges. This difference was not
significant, tð60:16Þ ¼ 1:11; p ¼ :27; n ¼ :17. For irrelevant items,
exchanges were given ratings on average 2:78 higher than condition-
als. This difference was significant, tð60:41Þ ¼ 12:67; p < :001;
n ¼ :97.3.3. Summary
The conventional and robust analyses agreed on the following
picture. There was a significant interaction of probabilistic rele-
vance and type of discourse (conditionals vs. exchanges). Proba-
bilistic relevance had a significant effect for both conditionals
and exchanges, but the effect was considerably more pronounced
with conditionals. For relevant items, conditionals and exchanges
did not differ; only in the irrelevant condition did same topic con-
ditionals and exchanges differ significantly.
Finally, all of these findings were mirrored exactly in the ‘‘how
sensible would it be to say” question. Table 2 shows the descriptive
data for this question. Fig. 4 shows the distributions of responses
for this second question. As can easily be confirmed by visual
inspection, these data are virtually indistinguishable from those
for the assertability question. For the sake of brevity, we thus omit
report of the full statistical analysis, noting only that the corre-
sponding analyses replicate all of the findings of the assertability
question.6by the presence or absence of discourse coherence relations, cf., Lascarides & Asher,
1993, p. 462–463, on the topic of narration). So their study includes ‘‘same topic”
items which would be ‘‘different topic” items on our terms. There is thus no tension
between the two sets of results.
Fig. 4. Results for the ‘‘sensibleness” question, DT and ST condition. Note the different scale for the y axis.
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Our data support the hypothesis that people expect a stronger
link between the clauses of an indicative conditional than between
other consecutive elements of discourse. Neither self-standing dis-
course elements nor conditionals are judged as natural to assert or
sensible to say when even the minimal discourse coherence
requirement is violated (different topics condition). Both types of
discourse are judged to be natural and sensible when there is both
minimal discourse coherence (i.e. the clauses are on the same
topic) and probabilistic relevance between antecedent and conse-
quent. However, patterns of responses diverge when there is min-
imal discourse coherence but no probabilistic relevance between
antecedent and consequent. In this case, self-standing discourse
elements were moderately assertable or sensible, while condition-
als were largely judged to be unassertable. This allows us to con-
clude that a conditional is assertable only if its antecedent is
relevant for the consequent. A coherence relation between p and
q (which may be sufficient to make q a natural response to p in a
conversation) is not sufficient for a conditional ‘‘if p then q” to be
assertable.
Conversely, this means that the lack of discourse coherence is
not a sufficient explanation for the oddity of missing-link condi-
tionals. This poses a challenge to any account of conditionals that
does not posit the need for a connection between antecedent and
consequent (Douven, 2015). This means another explanation for
their oddity is required, such as the fact that they make poor argu-
ments (Oaksford & Hahn, 2007).At the same time, the results suggest the need to take another
look at centering. It might be a valid inference in very specific cases
(such as those examined in Cruz et al., 2016). However, it seems
unlikely that this inference will be perceived as valid in general—
any more than inferences from co-occurrence to causation are nec-
essarily licensed. Future research should be directed at these
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